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Abstract  _ 
The  main  concern  of  this  paper  is  to  show  the  importance  of 
demand  uncertainty in the determination of the "natural rate of 
unemployment".  In the goods market there is demand heterogeneity 
-coming from preferences,  and demand uncertainty -related solely 
to heterogeneity.  Demand uncertainty is introduced in a  monopoly 
union  model  where  unions  set  wages  at  the  first  stage  of  the 
game,  without  knowing  with  certainty  the  demand  for  the  good 
produced  by  the  firm.  Because  the  union  assigns  a  positive 
probability  at  the  event  "underemployment  equilibrium",  it 
expects  that the  expected  unemployment  rate  be  positive.  Since 
all  the  uncertainty  is  firm  specific  (i.e.,  there  is  not 
aggregate  uncertainty),  aggregate  employment  is  equal  to  the 
union  expected  employment  and  then  there  is  unemployment  at 
equilibrium.  In  some  islands the  idiosyncratic  demand  shock  is 
high  and  firms  produce  constrained  by  its  full-employment 
capacity,  but  at  the  same  time  in  the  other  islands  the 
idiosyncratic  demand  shock  is  low  and  firms  optimally  produce 
less than its full-employment  output. 
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In unionized economies, nominal wages are normally set for a relatively long 
time of period, say one year, while employment fluctuates during the year 
depending on firms'  particular situation.  The standard  "right to manage" 
model,  as  in  McDonald  and  Solow  (1981),  even  if it assumes  that wages 
are set before the firm decides employment, does not reflect completely this 
important sequence in  the decision  process,  assuming  that both decisions 
are taken under the same information concerning the environment.  In  this 
paper, new  information is  reveled  in  between both decisions,  allowing  the 
firm  to decide  employment  with  a  richer  information  that the union  has 
when deciding wagesl .  This sequence in  the wage bargaining process leans 
on the assumption of nominal wages rigidities. 
Many different types of uncertainty are relevant to the analysis of wage 
bargaining.  Information  concerning  the aggregate  price  index,  as  in  Lu-
cas  (1972)  must generate some type of Lucas' supply curve.  Technological 
uncertainty or aggregate demand uncertainty could also be important to ex-
plain the behavior of employment and wages over the business cycle, as  it 
is  reported by  Hansen and Wright (1992).  However,  we concentrate our at-
tention on the effects of demand uncertainty coming from miss-information 
about individual preferences.  As it is frequently reported in the literature on 
Marketing, firms are mainly concerned with forecasting their market shares2 • 
However, macroeconomists seem to be more interested in the effects of tech-
nological  shock  and  aggregate demand shocks  than in  the effects  that id-
iosyncratic demand shocks have on the aggregate equilibrium. 
The  main  structure of the model  is  taken  from  Licandro  (1992)  and 
Arnsperger and de la Croix  (1993t  The economy  is,  in  some way,  orga-
nized  as  the Lucas  island economy.  In  each island,  there is  only one firm 
1Manning (1987) and Espinosa and Rhee (1989)  develop  more general frameworks  to 
analyze the question:  are wage  bargaining contracts efficient or do the union let the firm 
to manage employment?  In  both  papers it  is  assumed  that,  even  if both decision  are 
taken  sequentially  at two  different  stages  of the game,  the information  concerning the 
environment  is  the same in  both stages.  The existence of asymmetric information,  or 
costly information research, or costly bargaining process, could  be useful  to attempt an 
explanation for  this particular sequence of the wage bargaining process. 
2See Lambin (1993). 
3It is  an attempt of reconciling the "fix-price"  or  "quantity rationing approach"  with 
the "New-Keynesian economics," in particular with the monopolistic competitive general 
equilibrium approach.  We show in  this paper that the main results in Licandro (1992) and 
Arnsperger and de la Croix (1993) do not depend on the existence of "quantity rationing" 
in  the goods market.  The essential element of the model is  related with  the sequence of 
decisions and the structure of information. 
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-which produces a  differentiate~  good, a given number of households and a 
union, which represents households.  The information structure of the model 
is crucial.  It is a one period model, where decisions are made at two different 
moments in time.  Ex-ante, when preferences are not yet revealed, households 
decide to live and to work in a particular island and unions set the nominal 
wage.  Unions  are organized at the firm  level,  given  place to some type of 
descentralized negotiation.  Ex-post, when all relevant information is public, 
monopolistically competitive firms  decide prices,  employment and produc-
tion and households  decide  consumption.  The goods  market is  organized 
as  in  Dixit and Stiglitz  (1977).  Individual preferences are not symmetric, 
allowing for  demand heterogeneity, Le., some firms will  have a high demand 
and some other firms  a small demand.  All  the uncertainty is  idiosyncratic 
(Le,  there is  no aggregate uncertainty) and it is  directly related to demand 
heterogeneity. 
To  stress the importance of information problems, we  analyze a  simple 
monopoly union model1 in which there is full-employment at the equilibrium 
with  perfect  information.  However,  when  there are information problems, 
which  take the form  of demand uncertainty, the nominal  wage set  by  the 
union  does  not grant full-employment at equilibrium.  The existence of un-
employment does not rely on the existence of union power, as in the standard 
"right to manage" model.  In  this sense, this paper provides an explanation 
for  the "natural rate of unemployment,"  which  is  related to the existence of 
firm  specific demand uncertainty and nominal wage rigidities. 
The paper is  organized in the following way.  Section 2 describes the gen-
eral characteristics of the economy.  In Section 3 the representative household 
problem is  solved  and the demand for  goods is  computed.  In  Section 4 we 
solve for the firm problem and the monopoly union problem.  Section 5 gives 
the aggregate equilibrium.  Conclusions are presented in  Section 6. 
The Econoluy 
There are  three types of economic  agents:  households,  unions  and firms. 
Each household supplies a given  quantity of labor to a  particular firm and 
demands goods.  Households are represented by  unions, which are organized 
at the firm level and set wages.  Firms hire labor from  households, produce 
differentiated goods and set prices. 
A particular information structure is  assumed:  there are two times in the 
model, ex-ante (before the revelation of individual preferences  over goods) 
and  ex-post  (when  all  relevant  information  is  public).  Households  supply 
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labor and unions decide wages  without knowing with certainty the demand 
for the good produced by the firm.  When wages are already set, households 
reveal their preferences and demand goods and firms set prices, hire workers 
and produce. 
As  in  McDonnald and Solow,  there are two stages in  the game.  In the 
first stage the union sets the nominal wage and in the second stage the firm 
sets prices and hires workers in order to satisfy its demand.  The main differ-
ence with the standard monopoly union model is  that the firm information 
concerning the environment, when deciding employment, is  richer than the 
union information when deciding wages.  When the union sets the nominal 
wage the demand for  the firm  is  not revealed yet, while the firm  knows  its 
own  demand before deciding how  many workers to hire.  In this sense, the 
model imposes some type of wage rigidity. 
The Demand Side 
Households behave as  in Dixit and Stiglitz.  Let us assume that all of them 
have  the same utility function,  hold  the same initial money  balances and 
supply the same given quantity of labor. 
The Representative Household 
There is a continuum of households in the interval [0, n], each of them offering 
one unit of labor.  There is  also a continuum of goods in the interval [0,1]. 
Households are indexed by j  and goods by i.  Households are identical except 
for  the fact  that  their  labor  incomes  are not  necessarily  the same.  The 
representative consumer optimization problem is 
M)I-"Y C"Y max 
{c(i)},¥ 
- ( P 
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C = (1
1  v(i)~c(i)¥di) ~ 
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p( i)c(i)di = I; 
4￿ 1,  p and p(i)  Vi  E [0,1]  are given.  0  is  an index of consumption utility, M 
represents money holdings and p the aggregate price index.  c(i) and p(i) are 
the consumption and the price of the good i,  respectively.  The parameters 
I' ()  and v(i), Vi  E  [0,1],  are supposed  given.  1 represents  total nominal 
revenues  of the representative consumer and it  can  be different  from  one 
household to another. 





M  =  (1  -1)1. 
Notice that the "indirect utility function,"  which can be derived by sub-
stituting both optimality conditions in  the utility function,  is  proportional 
to real revenues. 
The optimality condition for  c( i)  is 
c(i) =  (p;)rC vii),  (1) 
where 




is  the "true price index" associated with the representative household utility 
function  5• 
Let us call I(j) at the total revenues of the household j: 
1(j) =  !if +w(j)l(j) + fl ~ 1r(i)di, 
n  lo n 
where  A1  represents aggregate initial  money holdings,  w(j) is  the nominal 
wage rate and l(j) E {O, I} represents employment.  Profits, denoted by 1r(i), 
are distributed among households.  The share of the firm  i  is  supposed to 
be the same for  all  households and equal to  ~.  The only difference among 
households comes from the equilibrium value of labor incomes w(j)l(j). 
4Since  the utility function  is  concave  in  its arguments and the budget constraint is 
linear, the first order conditions are necessary and sufficient for  a maximum. 
5The normalization condition imposed over  the v  parameters in  problem (1),  implies 
that p = p if p(i) = p'Vi E [0,1]. 
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Let us define profits as 
1r(i) = p(i)y(i) - w(i)l(i). 
Aggregating revenues over consumers, we have that 
l
n 
I(j)dj = At +pij. 
Variable ij represents aggregate production, and it takes the same functional 
form that the quantity index C. 
Imposing the condition fo
n C(j)dj =ij on the goods market, which must 
verify at equilibrium, from previous conditions we get 
Let c(i, j) represent the demand of good i from household j. Integrating 
equation (1)  over households we  have that total demand d(i) for  good i is 
d(i) =  (p~)r yv(i).  (2) 
Aggregate demand, ij, is distributed among the differentiated goods depend-
ing on relative prices and the v (i) para.meters
6
• 
Demand heterogeneity is directly related to the distribution of the v  pa-
rameter among firms.  It plays a very import role in  the model, because all 
uncertainty comes from  the absence of perfect information concerning this 
parameter. 
The Supply Side 
In the supply side of this economy there is  a continuum of monopolistically 
competitive firms,  each  of  them producing  a  variety  of  the unique good. 
The index  i  also  identifies  firms.  Each  worker  supplies one unit of labor 
6The firm  i market share is 
p(i)d(i) =(P(i))l-e v(i), 
py  P 
which  depends  on  both  the relative  price  and  the v(i)  parameter.  At the symmetric 
equilibrium the market share is equal to v(i). 
6 to an  specific firm
7 
•  Workers  are uniformly  distributed among firms  and, 
from  previous assumptions, the number of workers offering their labor to a 
particular firm is  n.  There is a continuum of unions, each of them represents 
the workers offering their labor to a particular firm.  Unions are also indexed 
by i.  At the firm level, unions set wages as a monopoly. 
An important assumption is  imposed to produce full-employment capac-
ities at the firm level:  labor markets are segmented.  Each worker is offering 
his labor to an specific firm  and, if a firm decides not to hire a worker, this 
worker  is  unable to offer  his  labor to another firm.  Labor market segmen-
tation can be justified by differences in human capital, labor mobility costs, 
turnover costs, etc.  Under this assumption each firm faces  an upper-bound 
on production, i.e., the "full-employment output". This assumption is crucial 
to have unemployment at equilibrium. 
4.1  FirIn Behayior 
Let us  assume that the labor marginal productivity is  constant and equal to 
one, i.e., there is  a constant returns to scale technology 
y(1:)  =  l(i) 
where y( i)  and  l(i)  represent firm's  i  production and employment.  Notice 
that firm's employment, l(i) E [0, n],  is  different to household's employment 
l(j) E {O, I}.  Full-employment output is equal to n for  all i. 
Under  the previous  conditions,  the representative firm  must  solve  the 
following optimization problem: 
max  7l"(i) =(p(i) - w(i))y(i)  (3)
p(l),y(,) 
subject to 
( ')) -8 
( ')  P z  _  (')  yz= ( p  yvz, 
y(i)  ~  n, 
where y, p, nand w(i) are given.  Parameters () and v(i) come from household 
preferences. 
The first order condition for this problem is: 
7Because the marginal desutility of labor is  zero, the representative household is  opti-
mally willing to work the maximum feasible time, which is  assumed to be one, 
7 if d(i)  ::; n, 
(  1)-1￿ p(i) =  1 - (j  w(i);  (4) 
if not, 
_ 1 
p(i) = p (~) i  v(i)~.  (5) 
Depending on the relation between demand d(i) and full-employment ca-
pacity  n,  the representative  firm  sets  prices  following  two  different  rules. 
When demand is  relatively small, the firm sets a price that verifies the stan-
dard condition for a monopoly, i.e., marginal costs equal to marginal revenues 
(interior solution).  When the optimal condition for  a monopolistic compet-
itive firm verifies for  a demand greater than full-employment capacities, the 
firm  sets  a  higher price in  order to satisfy demand at the full-employment 
level  (corner solution). 
Let us call 
(6) 
at the value of v(i) at which the interior solution verifies at the corner, i.e., 
both conditions (4)  and (5)  verifies simultaneously. 
From the restrictions in problem (3), and the corresponding optimal con-
dition  (equations  (4)  and  (5)),  we  can deduce the optimal employment of 
firm  i: 
if v(i) ::; v(i), 
. .  v(i) n 
l(z)=ld(z)=  v(i)  ::;n,  (7) 
if not, 
l(i) = n.  (8) 
In  the interior  solution,  the firm  is  choosing  employment  over  its uncon-
strained labol' demand curve, denoted ld(i)  in equation (7).  In  this case, the 
firm  does not employ all  the workers  living in  the island and there will  be 
unemployment in  this segment of the market.  In  the corner solution,  the 
firm is constrained by the labor supply and producing at its full-employment 
output. 
4.2  Monopoly Union Behavior 
In each island, a trade union represents the workers offering their labor to the 
firm  producing the corresponding variety.  The union is  assumed to behave 
8 as  a monopoly in the labor market. 
The objective function of the ith union is: 
V(w(i),l(i)) =  (W~i))  l(i), 
where V is the sum of the indirect utility functions of the risk-neutral mem-
bers after the deduction of the fall-back level, 
1 AI  1r(i)d' -+1-- z, 
pop 
i.e., the non-human revenues. 
The Standard Monopoly Union Model 
To  give  a better understanding of the results provided in this paper, let us 
solve first the standard monopoly union model, in which wages and employ-
ment  are  decided  under the same information  set.  Let  us  assume in  this 
section (this assumption will be dropped in the next) that the union has full-
information, in  particular that it knows  the value of v(i) faced  by the firm 
i.  It can  be easily shown that, under this assumption the monopoly union 
is optimally setting nominal wages in order to have full-employment at equi-
librium.  The main  reason for  that is  that the inverse of the labor demand 
elasticity 0) is  smaller than the elasticity of the indifference curves  (which 
is equal to one), anywhere.  In which case the union is interested in reducing 
wages until full-employment is reached.  As  Figure 1 shows, the optimal elec-
tion for the union is to set a nominal wage that induces the firm to optimally 
choose to produce at full-employment.  In  other words, the union is choosing 
w(i) in  such a way  that both equations (4)  and (5) verify simultaneously. 
Under these particular assumptions, if wages and employment are decided 
under the same information set, there is  full-employment at equilibrium in 
the standard monopoly union model. 
Monopoly Union Behavior under Demand Uncertainty 
Let us  assume that, when deciding wages, the ith union knows the "demand 
function"  assigned to the variety i, equation (2)  and the distribution of the 
v(i) parameters, denoted by  F(v).  However,  we  assume that the represen-
tative union  does  not know  with certainty the specific v(i) faced  by  the ith 
9 firm.  Since  there is  no  aggregate uncertainty,  the union  can solve  for  the 
aggregate demand ii  and the aggregate price index p. 
Notice that under this conditions all unions are ex-ante identical, even if 
ex-post the labor demand tan be different from one island to another. Then, 
they set the same wage rate and they face the same v.  For this reason, we 
can drop the i index for  the next. 
Since the objective of the union is linear in 1,  under demand uncertainty, 
the union is  mainly  concerned  with the forecast  of expected employment. 
From equations (7)  and (8), expected employment can be written as8 
E(l) =  ~ l~fJ vdF(v) +n l?fJ dF(v) ~ n,  (9) 
where v is given by equation (6). 
As  stated  before,  the distribution  function  F(v)  represents  the distri-
bution of  parameter v  among the different firms  and it depends on  house-
hold's preferences.  The union  knows  that its specific v  is  drawn from this 
distribution.  If there is  a  strictly positive probability of being in  a  unem-
ployment  equilibrium,  expected  employment  will  be strictly  smaller than 
full-employment. 
Let us define the weighted probability of being in a full-employment equi-
librium as 
PUJ(l  =  n)  = l?v E~l) dF(v), 
and the weighted probability of being in  an unemployment equilibrium as 
Pw(l  ~  n)  = % l~ij  E~l)  dF(v). 
The representative union problem is 
m~x E(V) = (;) E(l), 
where  E(l)  is  given  by  equation  (9)  and v is  given  by  equation  (6).  Be-
cause there is  not aggregate uncertainty, the aggregate variables p and ii  are 
perfectly forecast by the union. 
The first order condition for this problem is 
E(l) v =oj  v  dF(v).  (10) 
n  tJ~fJ 
SThe expected value of the minimum condition has been largely analyzed in econometric 
disequilibrium models, in particular in  the context of "aggregation over micro-markets in 
disequilibrium,"  as  it is  reported by Quandt (1988). 
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Condition (10) can be interpreted in the following way:  the union is optimally 
choosing the weighted probability of being in an unemployment equilibrium, 
whose optimal value is  equal to the the inverse of the demand elasticity of 
labor (~).  Notice that the weighted probability of being in a full-employment 
equilibrium is  equal to (1  - ~). 
Figure 2 gives a graphic representation of this problem.  The union maxi-
mize its utility function over the expected employment curve.  Because there 
is  a positive probability of ex-post unemployment, the union expected em-
ployment curve is  always  below full-employment,  in  particular at the opti-
mum.  The expected employment locus is  concave for  any standard continu-
ous distribution function, which is  a sufficient condition for the existence of 
an interior solution. 
Aggregate EUlploYluent 
Aggregate employment can be obtained by  aggregation over firm's  employ-
ment and it must be equal to union's expected employment given by equa-
tion  (9)9.  Moreover,  the optimality condition  (10)  must  hold  at equilib-
rium.  Aggregate employment I, aggregate production y, aggregate real wages 
(which are equal over all islands) and v must satisfy at equilibrium the fol-
lowing conditions: 
(;; 1)  =  ~  l~tIVdF(v) +l?fJ dF(v)  ~  1, 
(i) v = oj  vdF(v), 
n  v~fJ 
V =  ( 1- ~ r' (;)' (~) , 
and 
_  ] 6
(Y)  [1-6 j j  I  ~  ;;  =  v"'T  v~fJ  vdF(v) +  v?v vedF(v)  , 
To  better understand this result let us  present an example, in which we 
assume a particular form for the distribution fu nction F(v). 
9The proposed definition of aggregate employment is the standard addition ofemployed 
workers, which  does not take into account that the marginal value of workers is  not nec-
essarily the same in  all  islands.  For this reason the employment index and the production 
index are different, even if production is equal to employment for  each firm.  We  keep  the 
standard definition to be consistent with the literature on employment and unemployment. 
11 EXAMPLE 
Let us  assume that v  follows  a lognormal distribution, with unit mean and 
variance denoted by  (j.  In  this case  we  can apply Lambert(1988) and ap-
proximate expected employment by the following function 
where p is  a decreasing function of (j.  In  particular, *< 0,  P --+  00 when 
(j --+ 0 and we assume that p is  positive, i.e., the variance (j is not too large. 
The representative union problem becomes 
m~x E(V) =  (;) E(l) 
where 
and p,  y and n  are given. 
Solving this problem as in  the previous section and solving for  the equi-
librium value of aggregate employment  T,  we  have 
(11 ) 
Since workers are distributed homogeneously among firms and the mar-
ginal  productivity is  the same for  all  of them (it was  normalized to one), 
full-employment output n  is  equal across firms.  Moreover, since unions are 
ex-ante identical, they set all the same real wage.  Under these conditions the 
marginal cost function is  the same for  all firms and it is  constant and finite 
until full-employment is  reached, then it becomes infinitely elastic.  Depend-
ing on  their particular value for  v, firms  are setting prices and production 
either at the interior or at the corner solution.  When demand is  relativly 
small (v  < v)  in  an island, production is  smaller that full-employment out-
put.  When demand  is  relativly  large  (v  ~  v),  the firm  produces at full-
employment.  At the aggregate there is  unemployment. 
The unemployment rate takes the following  equilibrium value,  denoted 
by u, 
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The unemployment rate at equilibrium depends on the elasticity of substitu-
tion  ()  and on the parameter p,  which depends on the variance of the distri-
bution of the v  parameter.  If ()  -+ 00 all goods become perfect substitutes, 
and if  p -+ 00 the parameter v becomes the same for all goods.  In both cases 
the heterogeneity of demand disapears and the unemployment rate goes to 
zero.  The first  derivative of u with respect to both parameters is  negative, 
i.e., an increase in demand heterogeneity, coming from a greater elasticity of 
substitution or a great dispersion on  the v  parameters, always generates an 
increase in the unemployment rate. 
Conclusions 
The main concern of this paper is to show the importance of demand uncer-
tainty in  the determination of the "natural rate of unemployment." Demand 
uncertainty is introduced in a monopoly union model where unions set wages 
at the first stage of the game, without knowing with certainty the demand for 
the good produced by the firm.  Because the union assigns a positive probabil-
ity at the event "underemployment equilibrium," it sets an optimal nominal 
wage at which the expected employment is smaller than full-employment.  In 
an economy  where all  the uncertainty is  firm  specific (i.e.,  there is  not ag-
gregate uncertainty), aggregate employment is  equal to the union expected 
employment and then there is unemployment at equilibrium.  In some islands 
the idiosyncratic demand shock is  high and firms produce constrained by its 
full-employment capacity, but at the same time in  the other islands the id-
iosyncratic demand shock  is  low  and firms  optimally produce less  than its 
full-employment output. 
The existence of unemployment depends crucially on the assumption of 
demand heterogeneity and demand uncertainty.  The assumptions of nominal 
wage  rigidity and labor market segmentation are not sufficient to generate 
this result.  Moreover, the assumption of only one firm per island (monopolis-
tic competition) is  not critical for the existence of unemployment at equilib-
rium, and the result holds even if there is  perfect competition on the goods 
market of each island.  In  this sense,  the "natural rate of unemployment," 
displayed by  the model at equilibrium, relies mainly on the existence of "in-
formation problems"  than on the existence of "coordination failures". 
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Figure 2: The Monopoly Union Model under Demand Uncertainty 